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Abstract
This work is an application of game theory to quantum informa-
tion. In a state estimate, we are given observations distributed accord-
ing to an unknown distribution Pθ (associated with award Q), which
Nature chooses at random from the set {Pθ : θ ∈ Θ} according to a
known prior distribution µ on Θ, we produce an estimate M for the
unknown distribution Pθ, and in the end, we will suffer a relative en-
tropy cost R(P ;M), measuring the quality of this estimate, therefore
the whole utility is taken as P ·Q−R(P ;M).
In an introduction to strategic game, a sufficient condition for min-
imax theorem is obtained; An estimate is explored in the frame of
game theory, and in the view of convex conjugate, we reach one new
approach to quantum relative entropy, correspondingly quantum mu-
tual entropy, and quantum channel capacity, which are more general,
in the sense, without Radon-Nikodym (RN) derivatives. Also the
monotonicity of quantum relative entropy and the additivity of quan-
tum channel capacity are investigated.
1 Introduction
Much of quantum information has been concerned with the estimate.
We are given observations distributed according to an unknown distri-
bution Pθ (associated with award Q), which Nature chooses at random
from the set {Pθ : θ ∈ Θ} according to a known prior distribution µ
on Θ, we produce an estimate M for the unknown distribution Pθ.
In the end, we will suffer a cost, measuring the quality of this esti-
mate, therefore the whole utility is in terms of award and cost. One
such cost function is relative entropy function R(P ;M), important in
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several fields, such as information theory, data compression, compu-
tational learning theory, game theory, statistics, statistical mechanics,
and econometrics.
In the source coding interpretation of the estimate, the minimax
value of this game can be interpreted as the capacity of the channel
from Θ to X; In computational learning theory, the minimax value of
this game is the utility shared by an adaptive algorithm, predicting
each observation before it arrives on the previous observation, com-
pared to an algorithm predicting after knowing the real distribution; In
gambling theory and mathematical finance, the relative entropy mea-
sures the expected reduction in the logarithm of compounded wealth
due to lack of knowledge of the true distribution, thus the minimax
value of this game is the practical compounded wealth.
In this paper, an introduction to strategic game will be briefly
given, during which a sufficient condition for minimax theorem is ob-
tained; an estimate is explored in the frame of game theory, and in
the view of convex conjugate, we reach one new approach to quantum
relative entropy, quantum mutual entropy, and quantum channel ca-
pacity, which are more general, in the sense, without Radon-Nikodym
(RN) derivatives. Also the monotonicity of quantum relative entropy
and the additivity of quantum channel capacity will be discussed.
The structure of the paper is organized as follows: In the second
section, we will give a brief introduction to strategic game, during
which a sufficient condition for minimax theorem is obtained; In the
third section, we will introduce convex conjugate along with some
examples, mainly on its important mathematical properties for our
application; In the fourth section, we introduce an estimate in the
frame of game theory with the cost of classical relative entropy and
reach one new approach to classical relative entropy in the view of
convex conjugate; Similarly, we introduce this approach to quantum
relative entropy, in the section five, especially the monotonicity of
quantum relative entropy is discussed, and further one approach to
quantum mutual entropy will be given in the sixth section; The section
seven is for quantum channel capacity and its additivity; Final section
is for conclusion and possible further problems.
2 Strategic Game
Extending the simpler optimization approach developed in variation
methods and mathematical programming in mathematics, optimiza-
tion theory and algorithms in information and computer science, and
operation research in neoclassical economics, game theory studies sit-
uations where multiple players make decisions in an attempt to max-
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imize their returns. The essential feature is to provide a formal mod-
eling approach to social or informational situations in which decision
makers interact with other agents.
Some game theoretic analysis appear similar to decision theory,
but game theory studies decisions made in an environment in which
players interact. Alternatively, game theory studies choice of optimal
behavior when costs and benefits of each option depend upon the
choices of other individuals. In this sense, game theory, much more
than decision theory, is of similar spirit and situation to information
and computer science.
Since Von Neumann and and O. Morgenstern’s classic Theory of
Games and Economic Behavior [NM 1944] in 1944, there are many
introductions to game theory, such as [OR 1994]. In this section, we
briefly introduce strategic game, mainly general definitions, existence
theorems, and competitive game.
2.1 General Definitions
In game theoretic models, the basic entity is a player. A player may be
interpreted as an individual or as a group of individuals making a de-
cision. Once we define the set of players, we may distinguish between
two types of models: those in which the sets of possible strategies of
individual players are primitive; those in which the sets of possible
joint strategies of groups of players are primitive. Models of the first
type are referred to as ”noncooperative”.
A strategic game is a model of interactive decision-making in which
each decision-maker chooses his plan of strategy once for all, and that
these choices are made simultaneously. The model consists of a finite
set N of players and, for each player i, a set of Ai of strategies and a
utility function on the set of strategy profiles A1 × . . .×AN .
Definition 1 ([Borel 1953], [Neumann 1928]) A non-cooperative
finite strategic game consists of
• a finite set N ( the set of players)
and for each player i ∈ N ,
• a set Ai (the set of strategies available to player i on strategy
profile)
• a payoff function ui : A → R, where A ≡ ×Nj=1Aj (the payoff of
player i).
Denote by Σi the set of probability measures over Ai, which are
player i’s mixed strategies. And denote by the suffix −i all players
except i.
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In the play of a strategic game, each player holds the correct ex-
pectation about the other players’ behavior and acts rationally, thus
a steady state is reached. If not attempting to examine the process
by which a steady state is reached, we call it Nash equilibrium.
Definition 2 ([Nash 1950]) A mixed Nash equilibrium of a finite
strategic game 〈N, (Ai), (ui)〉 is a vector (π1, π2, . . . , πn), with πi ∈ Σi
for all i ∈ N , such that
Σa∈Aπi(ai)π−i(a−i)ui(ai, a−i) ≥ Σa∈Aρi(ai)π−i(a−i)ui(ai, a−i) (1)
for all ρi ∈ Σi and for all i ∈ N .
Therefore, pure-strategy Nash equilibria are those which only in-
volve degenerate mixed strategies.
The following restatement of the definition is useful elsewhere.
Definition For any a−i ∈ A−i, we define Bi(a−i) best actions to
be the set of player i′s given a−i:
Bi(a−i) = {ai ∈ Ai : ui(ai, a−i) ≥ ui(a′i, a−i)}. (2)
The set-valued function Bi is called the best-response function of
player i. Therefore, a Nash equlibrium is a profile a∗ of actions for
which
ai ∈ Bi(a∗−i), (3)
for all i ∈ N .
This alternative definition formulation points us to a (not neces-
sarily efficient) method of finding Nash equilibria: At first to calculate
the best response function of each player, then to find a profile a∗ of
actions for which a∗ ∈ Bi(a∗−i) for all i ∈ N . Obviously, if the function
Bi are singleton-valued, the second step deduces to solve |N | equations
in the |N | unknowns (a∗i )i∈N .
2.2 Existence Theorems
An existence result has two purposes: At first, if we have a game
satisfying the hypothesis of the result, it is hopeful to find an equi-
librium; Secondly, the existence of an equilibrium ensures the game
consistent with a steady state solution; Furthermore, the existence of
an equilibria for a family of games allows us to study properties of
these equilibria without finding them explicitly and without the risk
to study the empty set.
It is extensively investigated that under which conditions the set of
Nash equilibria of a game is nonempty. We here just introduce one of
the simplest existence result, whose mathematical level is much more
advanced.
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To prove that a Nash equilibrium exists for a game, it suffices to
show that there is a profile a∗ of actions such that a∗ ∈ Bi(a∗−i) for
all i ∈ N , which is a∗ ∈ B(a∗), if we define the set-valued function
B : A −→ A by B(a) = ×i∈NBi(a−i). Luckily fixed point theorems
give conditions on B under which there exists a value of a∗ for which
a∗ ∈ B(a∗). Generally we apply the following fixed point theorem.
Theorem ([Kakutani 1941]) Let X be a compact convex subset
of Rn and let f : X −→ X be a set-valued function for which
• for all x ∈ X, the set f(x) is nonempty and convex; and
• the graph of f is closed (i.e. for all sequences {xn} and {yn}
such that {yn} ∈ f({xn}) for all n, xn −→ x and yn −→ y, we
have y ∈ f({x})).
Then there exists a x∗ ∈ f(x∗).
Theorem ([Nash 1950, 1951]) A Nash equilibrium of strategic
game 〈N, (Ai), (ui)〉 exists if for all i ∈ N ,
• the set Ai of actions of player i is a nonempty compact convex
subset of a Euclidian space; and
• the utility function ui is continuous and quasi-concave on Ai.
Proof: Let set-valued function Bi the best-response function of
player i, we define B : A −→ A by B(a) = ×i∈NBi(a−i).
For every i ∈ N , the set Bi(a−i) is nonempty since the utility
function ui is continuous and the set Ai is compact, and also is convex
since the utility function ui is quasi-concave on Ai; B has a closed
graph since each utility function ui is continuous.
Following the Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, B has a fixed point;
any fixed point is a Nash equilibrium of the game as noted.
This result states that a strategic game satisfying certain condi-
tions has at least one Nash equilibrium; but a game may have more
than one equilibrium. Note that this theorem does not apply to any
game in which some player has finitely many actions, since the set
of actions of every player is not convex, but a mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium of every finite strategic game 〈N, (Ai), (ui)〉 always exists.
Theorem ([Nash 1950]) A mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of
every finite strategic game 〈N, (Ai), (ui)〉 always exists.
Proof: Let G = 〈N, (Ai), (ui)〉 be a strategic game, and for each
player i, let mi be the number of members of the set Ai, then we
identify the set ∆(Ai) of player i
′s mixed strategies with the set of
vectors (p1, p2, ..., pmi) for which pk ≥ 0 for all k and
∑mi
k=1 pk = 1 (pk
being the probability with which player i uses his ith pure strategy).
This set is nonempty, convex, and compact. Since expected payoff is
linear in the probabilities, each player’s payoff function in the mixed
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extension of G is quasi-concave in his strategy and continuous. Thus
a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium exists due to above theorem.
2.3 Competitive Game
Little obtained on the set of Nash equilibria of an arbitrary strate-
gic game, we discuss strictly competitive games and its qualitative
character of the equilibria.
Definition A strategic game 〈{1, 2}, (Ai), (ui)〉 is strictly compet-
itive if for any a ∈ A and b ∈ A, we have u1(a) ≥ u1(b) if and only if
u2(a) ≤ u1(b).
Player i maxminimizes if he chooses an action best for him on the
assumption that whatever he does, player j will choose her action to
hurt him as much as possible. We will find that for a strictly comple-
tive game possessing a Nash equilibrium, a pair of actions is a Nash
equilibrium if and only of the action of each player is a maxminimizer,
a striking result since providing a link between individual decision-
making and the reasoning behind the notion of Nash equilibrium, dur-
ing which we also find that for a strictly completive game possessing
Nash equilibria yield the same payoffs.
Definition Let G = 〈{1, 2}, (Ai), (ui)〉 be a strictly completive
game, the action x∗ ∈ A1 is a maxminimizer for player 1 if for all
x ∈ A1,
min
y∈A2
u1(x
∗, y) ≥ min
y∈A2
u1(x, y). (4)
Similarly, the action y∗ ∈ A2 is a maxminimizer for player 2 if for all
y ∈ A2,
min
x∈A1
u2(x, y
∗) ≥ min
x∈A1
u2(x, y). (5)
Theorem ([Neumann 1928]) LetG = 〈{1, 2}, (Ai), (ui)〉 be a strictly
completive game.
a) If (x∗, y∗) is a Nash equilibrium of G, then x∗ is a maxminimizer
for player 1 and y∗ is a maxminimizer for player 2.
b) If (x∗, y∗) is a Nash equilibrium of G, then
max
x
min
y
u1(x, y) = min
y
max
x
u1(x, y) = u1(x
∗, y∗), (6)
and all Nash equilibria of G yield the same payoffs.
c) If maxxminy u1(x, y) = minymaxx u1(x, y), x
∗ is a maxmini-
mizer for player 1, and y∗ is a maxminimizer for player 2, then (x∗, y∗)
is a Nash equilibrium of G.
Proof: First to prove (a) and (b). Let (x∗, y∗) is a Nash equilib-
rium of G, then u2(x
∗, y∗) ≥ u2(x∗, y) for all y ∈ A2, or u1(x∗, y∗) ≤
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u1(x
∗, y) for all y ∈ A2. Hence
u1(x
∗, y∗) = min
y
u1(x
∗, y) ≤ max
x
min
y
u1(x, y). (7)
Similarly,
u1(x
∗, y∗) ≥ max
x
min
y
u1(x, y). (8)
Thus u1(x
∗, y∗) = maxxminy u1(x, y) and x
∗ is a maxminimizer
for player 1. Similar argument for player 2, y∗ is a maxminimizer for
player 2 and u2(x
∗, y∗) = maxyminx u2(x, y).
Now to prove (c). Let v∗ = maxxminy u1(x, y) = minymaxx u1(x, y),
for a strictly completive game, we have −v∗ = maxyminx u2(x, y).
Since x∗ is a maxminimizer for player 1, we have u1(x
∗, y) ≥ v∗ for
all y ∈ A2; similarly, u2(x, y∗) ≥ −v∗ for all x ∈ A1. Taking y = y∗
and x = x∗ in those two inequalities, we have v∗ = u1(x
∗, y∗), again
considering this strictly completive game, we reach that (x∗, y∗) is a
Nash equilibrium of G.
Following part (c), a Nash equilibrium can be found by solving the
problem
max
x
min
y
u1(x, y); (9)
following part (a) and (c), Nash equilibria of strictly completive game
are interchangeable: if (x, y) and (x′, y′) are equilibria, so are (x, y′)
and (x′, y); following (b), for any strictly competitive game with a
Nash equilibrium,
max
x
min
y
u1(x, y) = min
y
max
x
u1(x, y) = u1(x
∗, y∗). (10)
If maxxminy u1(x, y) = minymaxx u1(x, y) = u1(x
∗, y∗), we say
this equilibrium payoff of player 1 is the value of the game.
Theorem Let A1, A2 be non-empty, convex and compact subsets
of Rn for some n. Let payoff u : A1 × A2 −→ R be a continuous
function, such that
• ∀a2 ∈ A2, the set {a1 ∈ A1 : u(a1, a2) ≥ u(a′1, a2),∀a′1 ∈ A1} is
convex; and
• ∀a1 ∈ A1, the set {a2 ∈ A2 : u(a1, a2) ≤ u(a1, a′2),∀a′2 ∈ A2} is
convex.
Then there exists an a∗ ∈ A1 ×A2, such that
max
a1∈A1
min
a2∈A2
u(a1, a2) = u(a
∗) = min
a2∈A2
max
a1∈A1
u(a1, a2). (11)
Proof: At first, continuous payoff function u is quasi-concave with
respect to two arguments, since ∀a2 ∈ A2, the set {a1 ∈ A1 : u(a1, a2) ≥
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u(a′1, a2),∀a′1 ∈ A1} is convex, and ∀a1 ∈ A1, the set {a2 ∈ A2 :
u(a1, a2) ≤ u(a1, a′2),∀a′2 ∈ A2} is convex.
Following [Nash 1950, 1951], a Nash equilibrium a∗ ∈ A1 × A2 of
this strategic game exists.
Further according to [Neumann 1928], for this competitive game,
max
x
min
y
u(x, y) = min
y
max
x
u(x, y) = u(a∗). (12)
3 Convex Conjugate
In mathematics, convex conjugation, as a generalization of the Legen-
dre transformation (in which sense, is also taken as Legendre-Fenchel
transformation or Fenchel transformation elsewhere), addressed much
attention in the study of extremum problems, among which are sys-
tem inequalities, the minimum or maximum of a convex function over
a convex set, Lagrange multipliers, and minimax theorems.
There are excellent books on the introduction to convex analysis,
such as [Rockafellar 1970] for pure mathematics, [Arnold 1989] for
application in theoretic mechanics. In this section, we simply overview
convex conjugation, first on its definition including some examples,
then on some properties for our application.
3.1 General Definition
Definition Let X be a linear normed space, and X∗ the dual space
to X, we denote the dual pairing by
〈., .〉 : X∗ ×X −→ R. (13)
Given a function f : X −→ R ∪ {+∞} taking values on the extended
real number line, we define the convex conjugate f∗ : X∗ −→ R ∪
{+∞} by
f∗(x∗) ≡ sup{〈x∗, x〉 − f(x)|x ∈ X}, (14)
or, equivalently, by
f∗(x∗) ≡ − inf{f(x)− 〈x∗, x〉|x ∈ X}. (15)
We consider convex conjugates for some examples, via simple com-
putations, following the above definition.
Example 1 An affine function is generally written by
f(x) ≡ 〈a, x〉 − b, a ∈ Rn, b ∈ R. (16)
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Then its convex conjugate f∗(x∗), denoted by Oa(x
∗), is
f∗(x∗) = Oa(x
∗) =
{
a x∗ = a;
∞ x∗ 6= a.
Example 2 The norm function is generally written by
f(x) ≡ ‖x‖. (17)
Then its convex conjugate f∗(x∗), denoted by O1(x
∗), is
f∗(x∗) ≡ O1(x∗) =
{
a ‖x∗‖ ≤ 1;
∞ ‖x∗‖ = 1.
Example 3 Let K ⊆ X be a convex subset and e(x) be the cali-
bration function
e(x) ≡ sup{〈x∗, x〉|x∗ ∈ K}. (18)
Then its convex conjugate e∗(x∗) is OK(x
∗), where OK(x
∗) is de-
fined as follows.
e∗(x∗) ≡ OK(x∗) =
{
0 x∗ ∈ K;
∞ x∗ ∈ Kc,
where Kc is the complement of K.
Example 4 The convex conjugate f∗(x∗) of exponential function
f(x) = ex is
f∗(x∗) =


x∗ lnx∗ − x∗ x∗ > 0;
0 x∗ = 0;
∞ x∗ < 0.
Let a cone X+ be {x ≥ 0} ⊆ X, and X∗+ ≡ {x∗ ∈ X∗ : 〈x∗, x〉 ≥ 0} its
dual cone. Then the convex conjugate f∗(x∗) of exponential function
f(x) = ex on X+ is
f∗(x∗) =
{
x∗ lnx∗ − x∗ x∗ > 0;
0 x∗ = 0.
3.2 Some Properties
Theorem The conjugate function of a closed convex function is a
closed convex function.
Proof: For every t ∈ R⋂[0, 1], and every x∗, y∗ ∈ X∗, according to
the definition of convex conjugate,
f∗(tx∗ + (1− t)y∗) ≡ sup{〈tx∗ + (1− t)y∗, x〉 − f(x)|x ∈ X} (19)
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= sup{(〈tx∗, x〉 − tf(x))+ (〈(1− t)y∗, x〉 − (1− t)f(x))|x ∈ X} (20)
≤ t sup{〈x∗, x〉−f(x)|x ∈ X}+(1−t) sup{〈y∗, x〉−f(x)|x ∈ X} (21)
≡ tf∗(x∗) + (1− t)f∗(y∗). (22)
Theorem (Order-reversing) Convex-conjugation is order-reversing,
i.e., if f ≤ g, then f∗ ≥ g∗, where f ≤ g means for every x ∈ X,
f(x) ≤ g(x).
Proof: Since f ≤ g, then for every x ∈ X,
f(x) ≤ g(x). (23)
According to the definition of convex conjugate, for every x∗ ∈ X∗,
f∗(x∗) ≡ sup{〈x∗, x〉 − f(x)|x ∈ X} (24)
≥ sup{〈x∗, x〉 − g(x)|x ∈ X} (25)
= g∗(x∗). (26)
Thus f∗ ≥ g∗, since every x∗ ∈ X∗.
Theorem (Biconjugate) The convex conjugate of a function is
lower semi-continuous. The biconjugate f∗∗ (the convex conjugate of
the convex conjugate) is the closed convex hull, that is, the largest
lower semi-continuous convex function smaller than f . Furthermore,
for proper functions f , f = f∗∗ if and only if f is convex and lower
semi-continuous.
Proof: For every x∗ ≤ x∗0 ∈ X∗,
f∗(x∗) ≡ sup{〈x∗, x〉 − f(x)|x ∈ X} (27)
≤ sup{〈x∗0, x〉 − f(x)|x ∈ X} (28)
≡ f∗(x∗0), (29)
which implies that the convex conjugate of a function is lower semi-
continuous.
Theorem (Fenchel’s inequality or Fenchel-Young inequality) For
any proper convex function f and its convex conjugate f∗, Fenchel’s
inequality holds:
〈p, x〉 ≤ f(x) + f∗(p), (30)
for every x ∈ X, p ∈ X∗.
Proof: According to the definition of convex conjugate, for every
x ∈ X, p ∈ X∗,
f(x) + f∗(p) = f(x) + sup{〈p, x〉 − f(x)|x ∈ X} (31)
≥ f(x) + (〈p, x〉 − f(x)) (32)
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= 〈p, x〉. (33)
Theorem (Infimal convolution) Let f1, ..., fm be proper convex
functions on X. Then
(f1 ⋆inf ... ⋆inf fm)
∗ = f∗1 + ...+ f
∗
m, (34)
where the infimal convolution of two functions f and g on X is defined
as
(f ⋆inf g)(x) ≡ inf{f(x− y) + g(y)|y ∈ X}. (35)
Proof: Here we just consider the case for m = 2, for x ∈ X
(f ⋆inf g)
∗(x∗) = (inf{f(x− y) + g(y)|y ∈ X)∗(x∗) (36)
= sup{〈x∗, x〉 − inf{f(x− y) + g(y)|y ∈ X}|x ∈ X} (37)
= sup{〈x∗, (x− y) + y〉 − f(x− y)− g(y)|x, y ∈ X} (38)
= sup{〈x∗, x− y〉 − f(x− y)|x, y ∈ X}+ sup{〈x∗, y〉 − g(y)|y ∈ X}
(39)
= f∗(x∗) + g∗(x∗); (40)
Since the infimal convolution is associative, i.e.,
[(f1 ⋆inf ... ⋆inf fm−1) ⋆inf fm]
∗ = (f1 ⋆inf ... ⋆inf fm−1)
∗ + f∗m, (41)
the theorem follows from mathematical induction for general m.
4 Classical information
In classical information theory, we need find fundamental limits on
compressing and reliably communicating classical data. A key mea-
sure of information is known as information entropy, usually expressed
by the average number of bits needed for storage or communication.
This section introduces basic classical information quantities, say
Shannon entropy, relative entropy, see, for example, [Shannon 1948],
for reference. We first overview basic mathematical forms of Shannon
entropy and relative entropy, then explore classical estimation in the
frame of game theory, and reach a new approach to relative entropy
in the view of convex conjugate.
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4.1 Classical Relative Entropy
Suppose there is a random variable with true distribution F (for the
density f). Then we could represent that random variable with a code
of average length H(F ), where Shannon entropy H(F ) is expressed in
mathematics as follows.
Definition (Shannon Entropy H(F ) of the distribution F )
H(F ) ≡ −
∫
f(x) log f(x)dx. (42)
However, due to incomplete information (we do not know F re-
ally), we assume G the distribution of the random variables instead.
Then the code would need more bits to represent the random variable.
The difference, in the number of bits, denoted by R(F ;G), between
a ”true” probability distribution F and an arbitrary probability dis-
tribution G is known as the relative entropy [Shannon 1948], or the
KullbackLeibler divergence, information divergence, information gain
in probability theory and information theory, which is expressed in
mathematics as follows.
Definition (Relative EntropyR(F ;G) of probability distributions
F and G)
R(F ;G) ≡
∫
log(f/g)dF, (43)
where f and g are the respective densities with respect to any domi-
nating measure.
Though the relative entropy R(F ;G) is often taken as a distance
metric, but it is not a true metric, since it is not symmetric between
distribution F and G.
There may be some interpretations for relative entropy, for ex-
ample, the relative entropy R(F ;G) may be interpreted as the error
exponent for the hypothesis test F versus G.
4.2 Classical Estimate
In a classical estimate, we are given classical observations distributed
according to an unknown distribution Pθ ∈ X ∈ ℓ associated with
award Q, which Nature chooses randomly from the set {Pθ : θ ∈ Θ}
according to a known prior distribution µ on Θ, we produce an esti-
mate M for the unknown distribution Pθ, denoted by P later without
notation confusion. In the end, we will suffer a relative entropy cost
R(P ;M), measuring the quality of this estimate, thus the whole utility
is P ·Q−R(P ;M).
In this section, we will investigate the existence of minimax value
of this utility, correspondingly its minimax strategy.
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We consider the utility P ·Q−R(P ;M), then the estimate problem
is in fact the following optimization problem
min
M≥0,M ·I=1
max
P≥0,P ·I=1
[P ·Q−R(P ;M)]. (44)
Considering the convex conjugation R∗M (Q) of R(P ;M) with re-
spect to P , that is,
max
P≥0,P ·I=1
[P ·Q−R(P ;M)] = R∗M (Q), (45)
we can rewrite the above estimate problem as follows.
min
M≥0,M ·I=1
max
P≥0,P ·I=1
[P ·Q−R(P ;M)] = min
M≥0,M ·I=1
R∗M (Q). (46)
Remark If we take function R1(P ) as follows.
R1(P ) =
{ R(P ;M) P · I = 1;
∞ P · I 6= 1.
Then we can write in the following form.
max
P≥0
[P ·Q−R1(P )] = R∗M (Q), (47)
where R1(P ) = R(P ;M) + OA1(P ), and the hyperplane A1 = {P :
P · I = 1}.
Applying the Lagrange Theorem, we obtain the following result.
R∗M (Q) = max
P≥0,P ·I=1
[P ·Q−RM (P )] = min
λ
max
P≥0
[P ·Q−R1(P )+λ(P ·I−1)].
(48)
Since the function P · Q − R1(P ) + λ(P · I − 1) is linear with
respect to λ and convex with respect to P , the min and max can be
exchanged, i.e.,
min
λ
max
P≥0
[P ·Q−R1(P )+λ(P ·I−1)] = max
P≥0
min
λ
[P ·Q−R1(P )+λ(P ·I−1)],
(49)
therefore we obtain the following result.
R∗M (Q) = max
P≥0,P ·I=1
[P ·Q−R1(P )] = max
P≥0
min
λ
[P ·Q−R1(P )+λ(P ·I−1)].
(50)
Remark If considering this optimization problem, at first, with
respect to λ, that is,
max
P≥0
[P ·Q−R1(P )+OA1(P )] = max
P≥0
[P ·Q−R1(P )+min
λ
λ(P ·I−1)],
(51)
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we obtain the following result.
R∗M (Q) = max
P≥0
[P ·Q−R1(P ) + min
λ
λ(P · I − 1)]. (52)
To consider the optimization problem
min
λ
max
P≥0
[P ·Q−R1(P ) + λ(P · I − 1)], (53)
applying the variational method, it suffices to consider the function
U = P ·Q−R1(P ) + λ(P · I − 1), (54)
or, equivalently, the function
∑
x
Px(Qx + ln
Px
Mx
+ λ)− λ, (55)
and we obtain the result.
δU = δPx(Qx + ln
Mx
Px
+ λ− 1) + δλ(
∑
x
Px − 1), (56)
from which we obtain the following result.
Qx + ln
Mx
Px
+ λ− 1 = 0. (57)
Therefore, we reached following two results.
P ∗x =Mx · exp(Qx + λ− 1), (58)
R∗M (Q) = P ∗ ·Q−RM (P ∗) = −
∑
x
Mx exp(Qx+λ−1)(λ−1). (59)
Considering further P · I = 1, we obtain the following results.
exp(λ− 1) = 1∑
xMx expQx
, (60)
P ∗x =
Mx · expQx∑
xMx expQx
, (61)
R∗M (Q) = P ∗ ·Q−RM (P ∗) = ln(
∑
x
Mx expQx). (62)
Remark It is easy to see that RM (P ∗) = P ∗ · Q − R∗M (Q) is
the classical relative entropy under the maximal utility, or classical
relative capacity under given utility.
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Since the set {M : M ≥ 0,M · I = 1} is convex, the minimum
of function RM (P ∗) always exists with respect to M . Therefore, we
reach the following main result.
Theorem The minimax value, associated with the above estimate
game, defined by
V = inf
M≥0,M ·I=1
sup
P≥0,P ·I=1
[P ·Q−R(P ;M)], (63)
makes sense, and so does its minimax strategy.
Remark We can similarly define the maxmin value, associated
with the above estimate game, by
V = sup
P≥0,P ·I=1
inf
M≥0,M ·I=1
[P ·Q−R(P ;M)], (64)
but it is needy to consider if this maxmin value and its maxmin strat-
egy always exist, and further if this maxmin value is the same as the
minimax value when this maxmin value always exists.
4.3 Convex Conjugate View
In the above, we applied the convex conjugate R∗M (Q) of classical
relative entropy RM (P ) with respect to P , i.e.,
R∗M (Q) = max
P≥0,P ·I=1
{P ·Q−RM (P )}, (65)
and obtained the following formula
R∗M (Q) = ln(
∑
x
Mx expQx), (66)
but starting from the resultR∗M (Q) = ln(
∑
xMx expQx) and applying
the above biconjugate property, we can define the classical relative
entropy as follows.
Definition Classical relative entropy R(ρ;M) of ρ relative to M
is defined as
R(ρ;M) ≡ RM (ρ) = max
Q
{< ρ,Q > −R∗M (Q)}, (67)
where R∗M (Q) = ln(
∑
xMx expQx).
Obviously, the simple computation will give us the mathematical
form of classical relative entropy.
Proposition Classical relative entropy of {ρx} relative to {Mx}
is equal to
∑
x[ρx log(ρx/Mx)], that is,
R(ρ;M) =
∑
x
[ρx log(ρx/Mx)], (68)
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which confirms the unique mathematical form of classical relative en-
tropy, though still open to explain R∗M (Q) = ln(
∑
xMx expQx) com-
pletely in information theory.
5 Quantum Relative Entropy
Many information measures for Quantum Signals, for example, Von
Newmann Entropy [Wehrl 1978, OP 1993], Quantum Conditional En-
tropy [HOW 2005], Quantum Relative Entropy [Umegaki 1962], Quan-
tumMutual Entropy [NC 2000], etc, upon information theoretic expla-
nation and mathematical formula of Von Newmann Entropy. In fact,
at present stage, no original information-theoretic definition, similar
to shannon information entropy, is possible even for Von Newmann
Entropy except for the mathematical formula.
This section is for one new and general quantum relative entropy, in
the sense without Radon-Nikodym (RN) derivatives. First we simply
overview three types of quantum relative entropy, then investigate
quantum estimate in the frame of game theory, (here following the
terminology of classical estimate, the same terminology of estimate is
still used, but in a different sense away from quantum physics), and
reach one new mathematical form of quantum relative entropy, also
give some important properties including monotonicity of quantum
relative entropy.
Throughout this paper we prefer to use in what is following the
term ”information” for negaentropy, leaving the term ”entropy” for
the opposite quantities like relative negainformation S(̟;ϕ) = −R(̟;ϕ),
which coincides with usual von Newmann entropy S(̟) if it is taken
with respect to the trace ϕ = Tr.
5.1 Historic Review
There are several mathematical quantum relative entropies so far,
mainly Araki-Umegaki type [Araki 1976], Belavkin-Staszewski type,
Hammersley-Belavkin type [HB 2006]. This part overviews the basic
definition of quantum relative entropy of Hammersley-Belavkin type
and reduces to Araki-Umegaki type, Belavkin-Staszewski type.
We define the Radon-Nikodym (RN) derivatives with respect to an
arbitrary, not necessarily normalized, density γ ∈ A⊤ (i.e. a positive
linear functional on A),
̺γ = γ˜
−1/2̺γ˜−1/2, (69)
ςγ = γ˜
−1/2ςγ˜−1/2, (70)
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then we obtain quantum relative entropy of Hammersley-Belavkin
type (known as γ type elsewhere) as follows:
DefinitionQuantum relative entropy of Hammersley-Belavkin type
(known as γ type elsewhere) to compound state ̟ on the algebra
A⊗B, (or information divergence of the state ̟ with respect to a ref-
erence state ϕ) is defined by the density operator ω, φ of these states
̟ and ϕ as
Rgγ(̟;ϕ) = λ(
√
ςg(L−1ςγ L
′
̺γ )
√
ς), (71)
where L−1ς χ = ς
−1χ is the operator of left multiplication by ς−1 iso-
morphic to the operator ς−1 ⊗ IA¯, and L′̺χ = χ̺ is the right multi-
plication by ̺ isomorphic to the operator IA ⊗ ˜̺, g(r) is any strictly
positive function g(r) at r ≥ 1 with g(1) = 0 and operator-convex, λ
is a faithful, semi-finite trace.
Note that this quantity is introduced in [HB 2006] in order to char-
acterize the ”distance” as an information divergence between states.
Quantum relative entropy of Hammersley-Belavkin type (known as
γ type elsewhere) includes the other two relative quantum information
as special cases.
Corollary If γ = I, it gives quantum relative entropy of Araki-
Umegaki type (known as a type elsewhere) to compound state ̟ on
the algebra A ⊗ B, (or information divergence of the state ̟ with
respect to a reference state ϕ) defined by the density operator ω, φ of
these states ̟ and ϕ as
R(a)(̟;ϕ) = Tr[ω(lnω − lnφ)]. (72)
This quantity is used in most definitions of quantum relative en-
tropy. However unlike the classical case, this is not only possible choice
for informational divergence of the states ̟ and ϕ, and it does not
relate explicitly the informational divergence to the Radon-Nikodym
(RN) density ωϕ = φ
−1/2ωφ−1/2 of the state ̟ with respect to ϕ as
in the classical case.
Corollary If γ = σ, it gives quantum relative entropy of Belavkin-
Staszewski type (known as b type elsewhere) introduced in [HB 2006]
as
R(b)(̟;ϕ) = Tr[ω ln(φ−1ω)], (73)
where ω ln(φ−1ω) = ln(ωφ−1)ω is understood as the Hermitian oper-
ator
ω1/2 ln(ω1/2φ−1ω1/2)ω1/2. (74)
This relative entropy can be explicitly written in terms of the RN
density ωϕ as R(b)(̟;ϕ) = ϕ(r(ωϕ)), where r(ωϕ) = ωϕ lnωϕ.
Remark In finite dimensions and faithful states, the Belavkin-
Staszewski information divergence based on quantum relative entropy
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of Belavkin-Staszewski type gives better distinction of ω and φ [OP
1993] in the sense that it is greater than quantum relative entropy
of Araki-Umegaki type, and that it satisfies the following important
monotonicity property.
Remark Quantum relative entropy of Hammersley-Belavkin type
(known as γ type elsewhere) is more generous quantum relative en-
tropy, and includes Araki-Umegaki type (known as a type elsewhere)
and Belavkin-Staszewski type (known as b type elsewhere), but can
not exhaust all possibilities expect for commutative algebra, for ex-
ample, the trace distance Rtr(̺; ς) = λ(|̺ − ς|) and the fidelity dis-
tance Rfid(̺; ς) = 1−λ(|√̺√ς|) are not of Hammersley-Belavkin type
(known as γ type elsewhere)[HB 2006]. Undoubtedly, it is a challenge
to obtain a general information-theoretic definition for quantum rel-
ative entropy which reduces to a general mathematical formula for
quantum relative entropy.
For quantum relative entropy of the three types, it is easy to obtain
the well-known monotonicity inequality.
Theorem Given a normal completely positive unital map K :
M→M0, if ̟ = ̟0K,ϕ = ϕ0K, then for both relative entropies,
R(̟;ϕ) ≤ R(̟0;ϕ0). (75)
Remark In fact, this monotonicity property is proved in [Lindblad
1973, Holevo 1998a] for Araki-Umegaki type (known as a type else-
where). And Belavkin-Staszewski type (known as b type elsewhere)
and Hammersley-Belavkin type (known as γ type elsewhere) satis-
fies a system of properties [HB 2006] for quantum relative entropy
including this monotonicity inequality. Therefore this monotonicity
property holds for the three quantum relative entropies.
5.2 Quantum Estimate
In a quantum estimate, we are given quantum observations distributed
according to an unknown distribution Pθ ∈ X associated with awardQ
(where X is a predual space of Hermitian W ∗-continuous functionals
on a W ∗-algebra X∗ = A), which Nature chooses randomly from the
set {Pθ : θ ∈ Θ} according to a known prior distribution µ on Θ, and
we produce an estimate M for the unknown distribution Pθ. In the
end, we will suffer a relative entropy cost R(P ;M), measuring the
quality of this estimate, thus the whole utility is taken as P · Q −
R(P ;M).
There are several mathematical quantum relative entropies, mainly
Araki-Umegaki type, Belavkin-Staszewski type, Hammersley-Belavkin
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type, and similarly three different mathematical forms of game the-
oretic utilities. Below we concentrate on quantum relative entropy
of Araki-Umegaki type, since other two types of quantum relative en-
tropy are just mathematical complex in Radon-Nikodym (RN) deriva-
tives but with the same intrinsic method.
Applying the convex conjugate R∗M,µ(Q) of R(P ;M) with respect
to P , that is,
R∗M,µ(Q) = max
P≥0,P ·I=µ
[P ·Q−R(P ;M)], (76)
the estimate problem is the following optimization problem.
min
M≥0,M ·I=1
max
P≥0,P ·I=µ
[P ·Q−R(P ;M)] = min
M≥0,M ·I=1
R∗M,µ(Q), (77)
where the cost function R(P ;M) here is taken as quantum relative
entropy of Araki-Umegaki type.
Remark If taking function R1(P ) as follows.
R1(P ) =
{ R(P ;M) P · I = µ;
∞ P · I 6= 1.
Then we can rewrite R∗M,µ(Q) as follows.
max
P≥0
[P ·Q−R1(P )] = R∗M,µ(Q), (78)
where R1(P ) = R(P ;M) + OA1(P ), and the hyperplane A1 = {P :
P · I = µ}.
Applying the Lagrange Theorem, we will find.
R∗M,µ(Q) = max
P≥0,P ·I=µ
[P ·Q−R1(P )] = min
λ
max
P≥0
[P ·Q−R1(P )+λ(P ·I−µ)].
(79)
Since the function P ·Q−R1(P )+λ(P ·I−µ) is linear with respect
to λ and convex with respect to P , therefore the min and max can be
exchanged, that is,
min
λ
max
P≥0
[P ·Q−R1(P )+λ(P ·I−µ)] = max
P≥0
min
λ
[P ·Q−R1(P )+λ(P ·I−µ)],
(80)
we can rewrite R∗M,µ(Q) as follows.
R∗M,µ(Q) = max
P≥0,P ·I=µ
[P ·Q−R(P ;M)] = max
P≥0
min
λ
[P ·Q−R1(P )+λ(P ·I−µ)].
(81)
Remark Considering this optimization problem at first with re-
spect to λ, then the following formula is reached.
R∗M,µ(Q) = max
P≥0
[P ·Q−R1(P )+min
λ
λ(P ·I−µ)] = max
P≥0
[P ·Q−R(P ;M)+OA1(P )].
(82)
19
Applying the variational method to the function U = P · Q −
R1(P ) + λ(P · I − µ), we obtain the following results.
Q+ lnM − lnP + (λ− 1)I = 0, (83)
TrP = µ. (84)
Simple calculations give us results as follows.
P ∗ =M · exp[Q+ (λ− 1)I], (85)
R∗M,µ(Q) = P ∗ ·Q−RM,µ(P ∗) = −Tr[M exp(Q+λ−1)(λ−1)]. (86)
Considering further about two conditions P · I = µ and M · I = 1,
we will find following three results.
exp(λ− 1) = µ
Tr[M expQ]
, (87)
P ∗ = µ
M · expQ
Tr[M expQ]
, (88)
R∗M,µ(Q) = P ∗ ·Q−RM,µ(P ∗) = µ ln[
1
µ
Tr(M expQ)]. (89)
Remark It is easy to see that RM,µ(P ∗) = R∗M,µ(Q) − P ∗ · Q is
the quantum relative entropy under the maximal utility over P ≥ 0
and P · I = µ, or quantum relative capacity under given utility. It
is one interesting problem to explain R∗M,µ(Q) = µ ln[ 1µTr(M expQ)]
completely in quantum information theory.
Easily we can find the following properties of R∗M,µ(Q).
Lemma The functionR∗M,µ(Q) = µ ln[ 1µTr(M expQ)] is monotonous
with respect to M .
Lemma The function R∗M,µ(Q) = µ ln[ 1µTr(M expQ)] is concave
with respect to M .
Since the set {M :M ≥ 0,M ·I = 1} is convex, there always exists
the minimum of function RM,µ(P ∗) with respect to M , and upon the
above lemmas, we reach the following main result.
Theorem The minimax value, associated with the above problem,
defined by
V = inf
M≥0,M ·I=1
sup
P≥0,P ·I=µ
[P ·Q−R(P ;M)], (90)
makes sense, and so does its minimax strategy.
Remark We can similarly define the maxmin value, associated
with the above problem, by
V = sup
P≥0,P ·I=µ
inf
M≥0,M ·I=1
[P ·Q−R(P ;M)], (91)
but it is a problem if this maxmin value and its maxmin strategy exist
and if this maxmin value is equal to the minimax value.
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5.3 Convex Conjugate View
In the above analysis, we applied convex conjugateR∗M (Q) of quantum
relative entropy RM (P ), that is,
R∗M,µ(Q) = max
P≥0,P ·I=µ
{P ·Q−RM (P )}, (92)
and obtained the following formula
R∗M,µ(Q) = µ ln[
1
µ
Tr(M expQ)], (93)
but starting from the result R∗M,µ(Q) = µ ln[ 1µTr(M expQ)], and ap-
plies the biconjugate property of convex conjugate, we can define the
quantum relative entropy Rµ(ρ;M) as follows.
Definition Quantum relative entropy Rµ(ρ;M) of ρ relative toM
is defined as
Rµ(ρ;M) ≡ RM,µ(ρ) = max
Q
{< ρ,Q > −R∗M,µ(Q)}, (94)
where R∗M,µ(Q) = µ ln[ 1µTr(M expQ)].
In particular, for the case µ = 1,
R1(ρ;M) ≡ RM,1(ρ) = max
Q
{< ρ,Q > −R∗M (Q)}, (95)
where R∗M (Q) = ln[Tr(M expQ)].
Obviously, the general mathematical form of this quantum relative
entropy may not include the mathematical form of the Araki-Umegaki
type, Belavkin-Staszewski type, or Hammersley-Belavkin type.
Here we obtain one property for this quantum relative entropy.
Theorem
∀µ > 0,Rµ(ρ;M) = µR1( 1
µ
ρ;
1
µ
M). (96)
Proof: According to the definition of quantum relative entropy,
Rµ(ρ;M) ≡ RM,µ(ρ) (97)
= max
Q
{< ρ,Q > −µ ln[ 1
µ
TrM expQ)]} (98)
= µmax
Q
{< 1
µ
ρ,Q > − ln[Tr( 1
µ
M expQ)]} (99)
= µR1( 1
µ
ρ;
1
µ
M). (100)
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5.4 Monotonicity of Quantum Relative Entropy
To obtain its monotonicity of R1(ρ;M) (or R(ρ;M) without notation
confusion), we need several lemmas in our notation system.
Let ρ, ζ be positive trace class operators in a separable Hilbert
spaceH, Γ a trace-preserving from B(H) to a von Neumann subalgebra
A.
Lemma 1([Kovacs 1966]) Let A be a finite von Neumann algebra.
For each X ∈ A and each inner ∗−automorphism α of A, there exists
X ∈ A such that 1N
∑N−1
n=0 α
n(X) −→ X as N −→ ∞ in the strong
operator topology.
Lemma 2 ([schwartz 1967]) Let A′ denote the group of all unitary
transformations in A, E(A′) the set of all non-negative real valued
functions on A′ which vanish expect at a finite number of points of A′
and which satisfy ∑
U∈A′
f(U) = I. (101)
Take f(X) =
∑
U∈A′ f(U)UXU
∗ for each bounded operator X, then
for each bounded operator X, there exists a sequence fn ∈ E(A′) such
that fn(X) converges weakly to an element of A′.
Lemma 3 Let X ∈ T (H) be a trace class operators in a separable
Hilbert space H, and K(X) the weakly closed convex hull of the set
{UXU−1,unitaryU ∈ A′}. (102)
Then
K(X) ∩ A = {Γ(X)}, (103)
{Γ(Y )} = {Γ(X)} for all Y ∈ K(X).
Moreover, let E(A′) be the set of nonnegative real functions on
the set U(A′) of unitary operators in A′ which are nonzero only on a
finite number of points and which satisfy
∑
f(U) = I. Take f(X) =∑
f(U)UXU−1, then there is a sequence {fn} ⊂ E(A′) such that
fn(X) −→ Γ(X).
Proof: Γ is normal, since the trace is normal, hence ultra-weakly
continuous.
If X ∈ T (H) be a trace class operators in a separable Hilbert space
H, Γ(X) is the unique element of A such that
Tr(Γ(X)Y ) = Tr(XY ), (104)
for all Y ∈ A, which implies that Γ(UXU−1) = Γ(X) for all unitary
U ∈ A′, hence Γ is ultra-weakly continuous Γ(X) = Γ(Y ) for all
Y ∈ K(X).
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The first statement results from Lemma 1; the last statement fol-
lows from Lemma 2.
Lemma 4 R(ρ; ζ) is jointly convex in ρ and ζ: If λi > 0,
∑
λi = 1,
then
R(
∑
λiρi;
∑
λiζi) ≤
∑
λiR(ρi; ζi). (105)
Proof: Since
Rµ(ρ; ζ) ≡ Rζ,µ(ρ) (106)
= max
Q
{< ρ,Q > −µ ln[ 1
µ
Tr(ζ expQ)]}, (107)
R(
∑
λiρi;
∑
λiζi) = max
Q
{<
∑
λiρi, Q > − ln[Tr(
∑
λiζi expQ)]}
(108)
≤ max
Q
∑
λi{< ρi, Q > − ln[Tr(ζi expQ)]} (109)
by additivity of inner product, <
∑
λiρi, Q >=
∑
λi < ρi, Q >, and
convexity of logarithm function,
=
∑
λimax
Q
{< ρi, Q > − ln[Tr(ζi expQ)]} (110)
by the positivity of λi for all i,
=
∑
λiR(ρi; ζi) (111)
by the definition of R(ρi; ζi).
Lemma 5 Let P be a projection in H, and take ρP ≡ PρP , etc.,
then
R(ρP ; ζP ) +R(ρI−P ; ζI−P ) ≤ R(ρ; ζ). (112)
Proof: Note that U = 2P − I is unitary and that
ρ′ ≡ ρP + ρI−P = 1
2
(ρ+ U+ρU). (113)
Following Lemma 4, we have
R(ρ′; ζ ′) ≤ 1
2
R(ρ; ζ) + 1
2
R(U+ρU ;U+ζU) = R(ρ; ζ). (114)
Note that
R(ρ′; ζ ′) ≥ R(ρP ; ζP ) +R(ρI−P ; ζI−P ), (115)
we reach the result
R(ρP ; ζP ) +R(ρI−P ; ζI−P ) ≤ R(ρ; ζ). (116)
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Lemma 6 Let Pn be a sequence of projections such that Pm ≤ Pn
for m ≤ n, dimPn is finite for all n, and Pn −→ I strongly when
n −→ ∞. Take ρn = PnρPn, then the sequences {R(ρn; ζn)} are
monotonously increasing and
R(ρn; ζn) −→ R(ρ; ζ). (117)
Proof: The monotonicity of {R(ρn; ζn)} follows from Lemma 5.
Recalling the facts,
Tr(Pnρ
2) −→ Trρ2, (118)
and
0 ≤ Tr[Pn(ρ2n−ρ2)] = Tr[Pnρ(I−Pn)ρ] ≤ Tr[ρ2(I−Pn)] −→ 0, (119)
we have the result
Tr(ρ− ρn)2 = Tr(ρ2 − ρ2n) = Tr[ρ2(I − Pn)] + Tr[Pn(ρ2n − ρ2)] −→ 0,
(120)
but ‖ρ− ρn‖2 ≤ Tr(ρ− ρn)2, consequently ‖ρ− ρn‖ −→ 0, that is, the
convergence ρn −→ ρ is uniform.
Note that R(ρ; ζ) is lower semicontinuous under the convergence
(ρn; ζn) −→ (ρ; ζ),
R(ρ; ζ) ≤ lim infR(ρn; ζn), (121)
but from Lemma 5, we know that R(ρn; ζn) ≤ R(ρ; ζ), hence we have
lim infR(ρn; ζn) = R(ρ; ζ). (122)
Lemma 7 Assume that {fk} ⊂ E(A′) satisfies
fk(ρ) −→ Γ(ρ), (123)
fk(ζ) −→ Γ(ζ) (124)
weakly, then
R(Γ(ρ); Γ(ζ)) ≤ lim infR(fk(ρ); fk(ζ)) ≤ R(ρ; ζ). (125)
Proof: Since Γ is trace-preserving, use the spectral measure of Γ(ρ)
(where positive operator ρ has the support projection I), there is a
sequence of projections Pn in A satisfying the conditions of Lemma 6.
From the definition of Γ, we have
Γ(PnρPn) = PnΓ(ρ)Pn. (126)
24
Since fk is bulit up of elements of A′, we result that
fk(PnρPn) = PnΓ[fk(ρ)]Pn. (127)
In the finite dimensional space, Hn = PnH, fk(ρn) −→ Γ(ρn) is
convergent uniformly, hence when k −→∞,
R(fk(ρn); fk(ζn)) −→ R(Γ(ρn); Γ(ζn)). (128)
According to Lemma 6, we obtain that
R(ρ; ζ) = supR(ρn; ζn), (129)
hence R(ρ; ζ) is lower semicontinuous, that is
R(Γ(ρ); Γ(ζ)) ≤ lim infR(fk(ρ); fk(ζ)). (130)
Following Lemma 4, we have
R(fk(ρ); fk(ζ)) ≤
∑
fk(U)R(UρU+;UζU+) (131)
= R(ρ; ζ) (132)
by the unitary invariance of R.
Hence,
R(Γ(ρ); Γ(ζ)) ≤ R(ρ; ζ). (133)
Remark According to Lemma 7, it is hard to prove Monotonicity
Theorem since we do not know if there is a sequence {fk} ⊂ E(A′)
which implements Γ on both ρ and ζ.
Theorem (Monotonicity) For trace-preserving expectations Γ from
B(H) to a von Neumann subalgebra A, if ρ and ζ are positive trace
class operators in a separable Hilbert space H, then
R(Γ(ρ); Γ(ζ)) ≤ R(ρ; ζ). (134)
Proof: Choose a sequence of projections Pn ∈ A, such that Pm ≤
Pn for m ≤ n, dimPn is finite for all n, and Pn −→ I strongly when
n −→∞, and {fk} ⊂ E(A′) such that fk(ρ) −→ Γ(ρ) weakly. Then
fk(ρn) −→ Γ(ρn) (135)
in norm.
For a given k, there exists gj ⊂ E(A′) such that gj [fk(ζ)] −→ Γ(ζ)
weakly when j −→∞, then
gj [fk(ζn)] −→ Γ(ζn) (136)
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in norm.
If ‖(fk − Γ)ρn‖ ≤ ε(k), choose gj,k such that
‖(gj,kfk − Γ)(ζn)‖ ≤ ε(k). (137)
Obviously
‖(gj,kfk−Γ)(ρn)‖ = ‖gj,k(fk−Γ)(ρn)‖ ≤ ‖(fk−Γ)(ρn)‖ ≤ ε(k). (138)
Then hk ≡ gj,kfk satisfies
hk(ρn) −→ Γ(ρn), (139)
hk(ζn) −→ Γ(ζn) (140)
in norm.
According to the proof of Lemma 7, we have
R(Γ(ρn); Γ(ζn)) ≤ R(ρn; ζn), (141)
and further following Lemma 6,
R(Γ(ρ); Γ(ζ)) ≤ R(ρ; ζ). (142)
Corollary Let Pk be a set of mutually orthogonal projections in
H satisfying ∑Pk = I and the map Γ : ρ −→ ∑PkρPk is trace-
preserving describing the interaction of a finite quantum system with
a classical apparatus measuring an observable with eigen-spaces Pk,
then
R(Γ(ρ); Γ(ζ)) =
∑
R(PkρPk;PkζPk) ≤ R(ρ; ζ). (143)
6 Quantum Mutual Entropy
Quantum mutual entropy was discussed in [CA 1997] via entropy
diagram, which seems not starting originally from the information-
theoretic sense. In the view of quantum control, quantum mutual
entropy is extensively researched, starting from [BS 2005] and more re-
cently [Belavkin 2001a, 2001b, BO 2001, BO 2002, SW 2006]. Belavkin
and Ohya [BO 2001, 2002] introduced quantum mutual information as
the von Neumann negaentropy R(̟) = −S(̟) of the entangled com-
pound state related to negaentropy R(̺⊗ ς) = −S(̺⊗ ς) of the prod-
uct of marginal states, i.e. as the relative negaentropy R(a)(̟;ϕ) =
−S(a)(̟;ϕ), in the sense of Lindblad, Araki and Umegaki relative
entropy [Lindblad 1973, Araki 1976, Umegaki 1962] with respect to
ϕ = ̺⊗ ς.
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Naturally this approach treats quantum mutual entropy via entan-
glement based on quantum relative entropy, therefore we can further
define quantum mutual entropy via quantum entanglement.
DefinitionWe define the quantum mutual information IA,B(π) =
IB,A(π∗) of both types in a compound state ω achieved by a quantum
entanglement π : B → A∗, or by π∗ : A → B∗ with
̺(A) = ̟(A⊗ I) = TrG[Aρ], ς(B) = ̟(I ⊗B) = TrH[Bσ] (144)
as the quantum relative entropy of the state ̟ on M = A⊗ B with
the respect to the product state φ = ̺⊗ ς:
IA,B(π) = R(ω; ρ⊗ σ). (145)
Theorem Let λ : B → A0∗ be an entanglement of the state
σ(B) = Tr[λ(B)] to (A0, ρ0) with A0 ⊆ L(G0), ̺0 = λ(I) on B, and
π = K∗λ be entanglement to the state ρ = ρ
0K on A ⊆ G defined as
the composition of λ with the predual operator K∗ : A0∗ → A∗ nor-
mal completely positive unital map K : A → A0, then the following
monotonicity inequality holds
RA,B(π) ≤ RA0,B(λ). (146)
Proof: This follows from the commutativity of the following dia-
grams:
A∗ A0∗
K∗oo
B
π
ggP
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
λ
__@
@
@
@
@
@
@
Commutative diagram for en-
tanglement π
A K //
π∗
((PP
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P A0
λ∗
  B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B∗
Dual commutative diagram for
entanglement π∗
Applying the monotonicity property of our new quantum relative
entropy on M = A⊗B with respect to the predual map ω0 7→ (K∗ ⊗
Id)(ω0) corresponding to ̟0 7→ ̟0(K ⊗ Id) as the ampliation K⊗ Id
of a normal completely positive unital map K : A → A0.
Definition The maximal quantum mutual entropy JB˜,B(πq) as the
supremum
HB(ς) = sup
π∗(I)=σ
IB,A(π∗) = JB,B˜(π∗q ) (147)
over all entanglements π∗ of any (A, ̺) to (B, ς) is achieved on A0 = B˜,
̺0 = ς˜ by the standard quantum entanglement π∗q(A) = σ
1/2A˜σ1/2
for a fixed ς(B) = TrH[Bσ] is named as entangled, or true quantum
entropy of each type of the state ς.
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Similar definition for Araki-Umegaki type can be found in [Belavkin
2001a, 2001b; BO 2001, 2002], for Belavkin-Staszewski type in [BD
2007].
Definition We call the positive difference
HB|A(π) = HB(ς)− IA,B(π) (148)
entangled (or true quantum) conditional entropy respectively of each
type on B with respect to A.
Similar definition for Araki-Umegaki type can be found in [Belavkin
2001a, 2001b, 2002; BO 2001], for Belavkin-Staszewski type in [BD
2007].
7 Quantum Communication Channel
Entanglement-assisted quantum channel capacity, or entangled quan-
tum channel capacity is extensively researched, for example, entangled
quantum capacity [Belavkin 2001a, 2001b; BO 2001, 2002] via a com-
mon framework, entanglement-assisted quantum capacity [BSST 1999,
2001] via entangled quantum mutual entropy. We further discuss en-
tangled quantum channel capacity via quantum mutual entropy upon
our quantum relative entropy and its additivity property.
7.1 Quantum Channel Capacity
Let B ⊆ L(H) be the W ∗-algebra of operators in a (not necessarily
finite dimensional unitary) Hilbert space H. Generally we denote the
set of states, i.e. positive unit trace operators in B(H) by S(H),
the set of all m-dimensional projections by Pm(H) and the set of all
projections by P(H).
Definition A quantum channel Γ is a normal unital completely
positive linear map (UCP) of B into the same or another algebra
B0 ⊆ B(H0). These maps admit the Kraus decomposition, which is
usually written in terms of the dual map Γ∗ : B0∗ → B∗ as Γ∗(σ0) =∑
k Akσ
0A∗k ≡ Γ∗(σ0) ([Stinespring 1955], [Lindblad 1973], [Holevo
1998a]), Γ(B) =
∑
k A
∗
kBAk, for Ak are operators H0 →H satisfying∑
k A
∗
kAk = I
0.
For example, quantum noiseless channel in the case B = L(H),
B0 = L(H0) is described by a single isometric operator Y : H0 → H
as Γ(B) = Y ∗BY . See for example [Holevo 1998a, Lindblad 1991] for
the simple cases B = L(H), dim(H) <∞.
A noisy quantum channel sends input pure states ς0 = ̺0 on the
algebra B0 = L(H0) into mixed states described by the output densi-
ties σ = Γ∗(σ0) on B ⊆ L(H) given by the predual Γ∗ = Γ∗ | B0∗ to the
28
normal completely positive unital map Γ : B → B0 which can always
be written as
Γ(B) = TrF+ [Y
†BY ]. (149)
Here Y is a linear operator from H0 ⊗F+ to H with TrF+ [Y †Y ] = I,
and F+ is a separable Hilbert space of quantum noise in the channel.
Each input mixed state ς0 is transmitted into an output state ς = ς0Γ
given by the density operator
Γ∗(ς0) = Y (σ0 ⊗ I+)Y † ∈ B∗ (150)
for each density operator σ0 ∈ B0∗, the identity operator I+ ∈ F+.
We follow [Belavkin 2001a, 2001b; BO 2001, 2002] to denote Kq
the set of all normal completely positive maps κ : A → B0 with any
probe algebra A, normalized as Trκ(I) = 1, and Kq(ς0) be the subset
of κ ∈ Kq with κ(I) = σ0. We take the standard entanglement π0q
on (B0, ς0) = (A0, ̺0), where ̺0(A0) = Tr[A0ρ0] given by the density
operator ρ0 = σ
0, and denote byK a normal unital completely positive
map A → A0 = A˜0 that decomposes κ as κ(A) = ρ1/20 K˜(A)ρ1/20 . It
defines an input entanglement κ∗ = K∗π
0
q on the input of quantum
channel as transpose-completely positive map on A0 = B0 into A∗
normalized to ρ = K∗ρ
0, ρ0 = ρ˜0.
The channel Γ transmits this input entanglement as a true quan-
tum encoding into the output entanglement π = K∗π
0
qΓ ≡ K∗λ map-
ping B via the channel Γ into A∗ with π(I) = ρ. The mutual entangled
information, transmitted via the channel for quantum encoding κ is
therefore JA,B(κ∗Γ) = JA,B(K∗π0qΓ) = JA,B(K∗Γ), where Γ = π0qΓ is
the standard input entanglement π0q(B) = σ
1/2
0 B˜σ
1/2
0 with σ0 = σ˜
0,
transmitted via the channel Γ.
Theorem Given a quantum channel Γ : B → B0, and an input
state ς0 on B0, the entangled input-output quantum information via
a channel Γ : B → B0 achieves the maximal value
J (ς0,Γ) = sup
κ∈Kq(ς0)
J (κ∗Γ) = IA0,B(Γ), (151)
where λ = π0qΓ is given by the corresponding extremal input entan-
glement π0q mapping B0 = A˜0 into A0 = B˜0 with Tr[πq(B)] = ς0(B)
for all B ∈ B0.
Note that simliar theorem for Araki-Umegaki type can be found in
[Belavkin 2001a, 2001b; BO 2001, 2002], for Belavkin-Staszewski type
in [BD 2007].
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The following definition depends on the commutativity of dia-
grams:
A∗ A0∗
K∗oo
B0
κ∗
``A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
π0
OO
B
Γ
oo
Γ
__?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Commutative diagram for
quantum channel Γ
with standard entanglement
π0 = π0q for A = B˜0
A K //
κ @
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
A0
π0∗

λ∗
  A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
B0∗ Γ∗
// B∗
Dual commutative diagram for
quantum channel Γ
with standard entanglement
π0∗ for A0∗ = B˜0∗
Definition Given a quantum channel Γ : B → B0, and a input
state ς0 on B0, we can define the input-output quantum entropy as
the maximal quantum mutual information
J (ς0,Γ) = IB0,B(π0qΓ) (152)
for input standard entanglement of the state ς0 to the state ̺0 = ς˜0.
Note that similar definition for Araki-Umegaki type can be found
in [Belavkin 2001a, 2001b; BO 2001, 2002], for Belavkin-Staszewski
type in [BD 2007].
7.2 Additivity of Quantum Channel Capacity
Here and below for notational simplicity we implement the agreements
Ai0 = B0i , ̺i0 = ς0i , A⊗0 = ⊗ni=1B0i , ̺⊗0 = ⊗ni=1ς0i such that ς⊗0 = ⊗ni=1ρ0i
is transposed input state ˜̺⊗0 = ⊗ni=1ς˜0i on B⊗0 = ⊗ni=1A0i with B˜0i =
A0i ≡ Bi0 = A˜i0, ς˜0i = ̺0i ≡ ςi0 = ˜̺i0,.
Let Γi be channels respectively from the algebra Bi on Hi to B0i
on H0i for i = 1, 2, ..., n, and let Γ⊗ = ⊗ni=1Γi be their tensor product.
We have the additivity property of this entangled input-output
quantum entropy upon the monotonicity property.
Theorem Let Γ⊗ be product channel from the algebra B⊗ =
⊗ni=1Bi to A⊗0 = ⊗ni=1Ai0, and let ̺⊗0 = ⊗ni=1̺i0 be the tensor product
of input states ςi0 on Bi0, then
J (̺⊗0 ,Γ⊗) =
n∑
i=1
J (̺i0,Γi). (153)
Proof : Take Γi∗ : B0i∗ → Bi∗, and ̺i0 ∈ B0i∗, ςi = Γi∗(̺i0) ∈ Bi∗,
and K
(n)
∗ : A⊗∗ → A(n)∗ , where A⊗0∗ = ⊗ni=1B0i∗, but A(n)∗ is pred-
ual to a general, not necessarily product algebra A(n) ⊆ L(G(n)).
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For π(n) = K
(n)
∗ π
0⊗
q Γ
⊗, below we consider quantum mutual entropy
IA(n),B⊗(π(n)) as quantum relative entropy
R((K(n)∗ ⊗ Γ⊗∗ )ω˜⊗0 : K(n)∗ (σ⊗0 )⊗Γ⊗∗ (̺⊗0 )), (154)
where ω˜⊗0 = ⊗ni=1ω˜i0 is the density operator of the standard compound
state ⊗ni=1̟i0 with ̟i0(Ai⊗Bi) = ω0i (Ai⊗Bi) = Tr[Bi
√
ρ0i A˜i
√
ρ0i ] for
Ai ∈ B˜0i , Bi ∈ B0i , corresponding to σ0i = ρi0.
Applying monotonicity property of quantum relative entropy to
the probe system (G(n),A(n)) for this given ̺i0 and Γi, we obtain
R((K(n)∗ ⊗ Γ⊗∗ )ω˜⊗0 ;K(n)∗ (σ⊗0 )⊗Γ⊗∗ (ρ⊗0 )) (155)
≤ R((Id⊗ ⊗ Γ⊗)ω˜⊗0 ; Id⊗(σ⊗0 )⊗ Γ⊗∗ (ρ⊗0 )) (156)
=
n∑
i=1
R((Id⊗ Γi∗)(ω˜0); Id(σi0)⊗ Γi∗(ρi0)), (157)
where σi0 = ρ
0
i = ρ˜
i
0, ρ
i
0 = σ
0
i = σ˜
i
0.
The suprema over K(n) is achieved on K(n) = Id⊗ identically
mapping A(n) = ⊗ni=1Ai0 to B⊗0∗ = ⊗ni=1Bi0, where Bi0 = B˜0i , coinciding
with such A(n) due to Ai0 = B˜0i .
Thus J (̺⊗0 ,Γ⊗) =
∑n
i=1 J (̺i0,Γi).
Definition Given a normal unital completely positive map Γ :
B → A, the suprema
Cq(Γ) = sup
κ∈Kq
IA,B(κ∗Γ) = sup
ς0
J (ς0,Γ) (158)
is called the quantum channel capacity via entanglement, or q-capacity.
Let Γ⊗ be product channel from the algebra B⊗ = ⊗ni=1Bi to A⊗0 =
⊗ni=1B0i . The additivity problem for quantum channel capacity via
entanglement is if it is true that
Cq(Γ⊗) =
n∑
i=1
Cq(Γi). (159)
In the spirit of [Belavkin 2001a, 2001b; BO 2001, 2002; BD 2007],
we prove this additivity property upon the monotonicity property of
our quantum relative entropy.
Theorem Let Γ⊗ be product channel from the algebra B⊗ =
⊗ni=1Bi to A⊗0 = ⊗ni=1B0i , then
Cq(Γ⊗) =
n∑
i=1
Cq(Γi). (160)
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Proof : It simply follows from the additivity (153). Indeed,
Cq(Γ
⊗) = sup
κ∈K
(n)
q
IA(n),B(κ∗Γ⊗) = sup
̺⊗0
J (̺⊗0 ,Γ⊗) = sup
̺⊗0
n∑
i=1
J (̺i0,Γi)
(161)
Therefore by further taking suprema over ̺⊗0 as over independently
for each i = 1, 2, ..., n, thus we have
Cq(Γ⊗) =
n∑
i=1
sup
̺⊗0
J (̺i0,Γi) =
n∑
i=1
Cq(Γi), (162)
which is the additivity property of entangled quantum channel capac-
ity due to encodings via entanglement obviously.
Remark Note that there is no such additivity for Holevo channel
capacity for a arbitrary channel Γ : B → B0. Indeed, this capacity is
defined as the supremum
Cd(Γ) = sup
κ∈Kd
IA,B(κ∗Γ) (163)
over the smaller class Kd ⊆ Kq of the diagonal (semiclassical) encod-
ings κ : A→ B0∗ corresponding to the Abelian algebra A. This supre-
mum cannot in general be achieved on the standard entanglement of
A0 = B˜0 ≡ B0 if A0 is non Abelian corresponding to the non Abelian
input algebra B0. Therefore the supremum Cd(Γ⊗) ≤
∑n
i=1 Cd(Γi) can
be achieved not on a product Abelian algebra A(n) as is was in the true
quantum case where we could take A(n) = ⊗ni=1Bi0 with non Abelian
Bi0 = B˜0i .
8 Conclusion
This work so far is just a game theoretic-application to quantum in-
formation.
In the introduction to strategic game, we obtained a sufficient con-
dition for minimax theorem, but it is still worth to explore the neces-
sary condition of minimax theorem;
In the exploration of classical/quantum estimate, we found the
existence of the minimax value of the game and its minimax strategy,
but it is still interesting to discuss the existence of maximin value
and its maximin strategy. One further problem is to give the general
bounds on those values;
In the view of convex conjugate, we arrived at one approach to
quantum relative entropy, quantum mutual entropy, and quantum
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channel capacity and discussed the monotonicity of quantum rela-
tive entropy and the additivity of quantum communication channel
capacity, and it is still worth to explore other properties and their
bounds.
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